A tenant of the U.S. Army Vision for future small scale contingency deployments is rapid force closure. To examine initial concept feasibility from an airlift transportation perspective, U.S. Transportation Command developed a Strategic Airlift Quick-Look Tool. Like other U.S. Quick-Look tools, this tool allows assessments to be made quickly using the best available data and planning factors flexibly defined by the analyst. This tool is unique in that it allows for the examination of up to 56 different scenarios simultaneously under various transportation constraints which impact closure. When evaluating future concepts, many variables are still soft. For the transportation analyst, these fuzzy variables may include the size of the dedicated airlift fleet, size of deploying force, level of hazardous cargo processing required, available en route infrastructure, etc. In order to assess the essence of the future transportation challenge, the analyst must take a broader look and examine the relative sensitivities of these variable on closure estimates. The purpose of this presentation is to share a Quick-Look approach to examining multiple scenarios at once to assess closure potential relative to variables of interest.
Published on 05/27/2018
Document details: 24 pages. 4 downloads.
DTIC ADA322606: Strategic Mobility Sensitivity Analysis of Selected Alternatives Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleet Study.
The analysis referenced in this report was an extension of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleet Study Phase 1 conducted in March-October 1980. The analysis investigated the impact of changes made in the U. S. Army's tactical wheeled vehicle fleet in terms of aircraft requirements needed to move U.S. Army units. The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Air Scheduling and Loading Model (ASLM) was used to calculate aircraft sorties required to move a type Infantry Division, a Mechanized Infantry Division, an Airmobile Division, an Airborne Division, and a Corps Support Force closely tailored to the Airborne D Package. Aircraft sorties were calculated for each unit tailored to each of alternatives 1, 2, and 9 of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleet Study. A comparison was then made of sorties required to move the alternative 2 and 9 tailored forces against sorties required to move the corresponding alternative 1 (base case) tailored force. The calculated number of aircraft sorties required for a strategic/intertheater deployment of the type units referenced in this analysis ranged from a low of 771 aircraft (691 C141B and 80 C5A) for the alternative 1 configured Airmobile Division to a high of 1491 aircraft (999 C141B and 492 C5A) for the alternative 9 configured Mechanized Infantry Division. In a strategic/intertheater air deployment, the impact of alternative 2 compared to alternative 1 ranged from a 1.4 percent increase in total aircraft for the Airmobile Division to a 4.3 percent increase in total aircraft for the Airborne Division. In a similar comparison between alternative 9 and alternative 1, the impact ranged from a 3.6 percent increase for the Airmobile Division to a 7.7 percent increase for the Infantry Division.
Published on 04/04/2018
Document details: 39 pages. 10 downloads.
A cyberweapon is weaponized software code that exploits flaws in software. It is only effective if the flaw still exists at the time of weapon deployment. Because of this, there is only a small window of time in which a particular cyberweapon can be used. Many argue that cyberweapons can only be effectively used once, and that after first use, the vulnerability will be patched. However, the target must first detect the attack, find the vulnerability that was exploited, reverse-engineer the cyberweapon to identify signatures, then create and implement a patch. This window of opportunity between attack detection and patch implementation allows an attacker to reuse the cyberweapon against different or even the same targets as long as the window of opportunity remains open. An attacker can increase the length of time the window remains open by obfuscating the cyberweapon's signatures to make it harder to detect the attack or by making it harder to locate and remove the weapon. This can be accomplished by incorporating survivability into the weapon's design requirement. This thesis explores the strategic implications of reusable cyberweapons by specifically looking at stealth as the critical attribute that allows a cyberweapon to go undetected and survive long enough to be effectively used more than once.
Published on 04/26/2019
Document details: 66 pages. 2 downloads.
The paper attempts to provide a basis for improving the analysis of strategic warfare by studying in detail the sensitivity of urban blast fatality calculations. It examines the effects of various assumptions on the resulting estimates of fatalities and attempts to uncover areas where errors are made. Two basic tools are used: a computer program that computes survivors in a city under an optimized attack with a given number of weapons, and a quasi-analytical damage law--the Square Root Damage Law. The computer program is used to study such effects as sensitivity of fatalities to weapon yield, reliability, or target vulnerability; and the Square Root Damage Law is used to correlate the results. A few metropolitan areas are studied in detail. Where possible a rationale is developed to explain the results obtained.
Published on 02/05/2019
Document details: 216 pages. 3 downloads.
An analytic technique is described for direct determination of the outcome of optimal aerial bombing or reconnaissance campaigns against strategic targets, without the customary laborious exploration of variations in attack strategy. The scope of this analysis permits wide latitude in the nature of the strategic campaign and its environment, including the following: the criterion defining an optimum campaign may be that of minimum cost, or minimum air crew loss for a fixed level of target destruction, with or without additional constraints such as specified maximum campaign duration; aircraft losses may be due to enemy area and local defenses, non-combat causes, or due to destruction while on their own base. Several examples are used to illustrate how the analytic method presented here leads to a better understanding of the significant features of strategic campaigns, and their sensitivity to variations in assumptions, than can be gleaned from an essentially empirical study of many individual campaigns.
Published on 09/22/2018
Document details: 36 pages. 5 downloads.
This consortium has initiated a focused collaborative program to advance matter wave sensors. We seek to combine atom interferometry with atom lasers and atom waveguides with the prospect of improving the sensitivity of such sensors by orders of magnitude as compared with existing state-of-the-art sensors. We will identify, explore and exploit fundamental scientific possibilities surrounding the production, manipulation and detection of ultra-cold atoms for a variety of sensing applications. Such sensors include gravimeters, gravity gradiometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers and frequency standards and have applications in science and technology and within the DOD. Sensitive and accurate inertial force sensors can be used in covert/passive navigation, precision guidance, underground structure detection, gravitational mapping, etc. They are non-emanating and capable of operating in a jammed-GPS environment. We seek to build awareness of DOD needs critical to national defense at the graduate training level, and to establish a dialogue between DOD and industrial researchers/managers and PhD trainees. The institutions identified in the proposed consortium attract talented students who are likely to become future leaders in science and technology.
Published on 05/19/2018
Document details: 16 pages. 3 downloads.
Terminal interceptors can use the atmosphere for discrimination. They also have disadvantages in development, cost, saturation, and susceptibility to preferential attacks. Terminal could be preferred for higher midcourse costs or decoys. Their main limitation is battlespace. It is possible to integrate boost- and terminal-phase defenses by reducing the number of reentry vehicles penetrating the boost phase to the roughly one per target terminal defenses could handle. Terminal defenses could offset boost-phase defenses' lack of preferentiality and midcourse defenses' sensitivity to decoys.
Published on 04/15/2018
Document details: 20 pages. 4 downloads.
Strategic Military Leaders manage national level relationships and represent their organization to the President, Congress, and the American people. These leaders must possess certain competencies to successfully interact in this environment. This study analyzes competencies identified in FM 22-103 as demonstrated by General Marshall during his period as Army Chief of Staff; identifies implications of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on competency requirements; and analyzes those competencies exhibited by General Powell while serving as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. This study concludes by identifying enduring competencies and those that have changed over time and provides recommendations for strategic leader development.
Published on 03/30/2018
Document details: 47 pages. 3 downloads.
As part of the War on Terrorism (WOT), the United States has implemented a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism that includes operations not only against terrorist organizations, but also against States that sponsor them. In support of the WOT, the Department of Defense has begun to conduct Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) operations against strategically important sites of significant intelligence value in such places as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These operations, although planned and executed at the tactical level of operations, have strategic implications for both the U.S. and the international community. Consequently, because of the increased frequency with which the United States Government (USG) can expect to conduct SSE operations to support the WOT, and because of the strategic impact that those operations can have, the U.S. should consider developing a long standing Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) with an appropriate mix of expertise drawn from the DOD, government agencies (i.e. CIA, DOE, and Justice Department), and select Non-Governmental Organizations (i.e. UN weapons inspectors and ICRC). This paper will assess the strategic implications that SSE operations have for the U.S. in the WOT, provide an overview of SSE doctrine, organization, and a review of recent operations. Based on the critical importance these operations have for the U.S., a proposal for a JIATF will be presented that argues for a longstanding organization composed of interagency members with the requisite expertise to conduct these operations in the future.
Published on 05/29/2018
Document details: 12 pages. 7 downloads.
This paper presents one approach to applying Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) to the highly complex and logistically unique Strategic Defense Systems (SDS). The paper briefly addresses each of the LSA primary task areas and the additional analyses required by the statement of work (SOW) tailoring of the LSA. Each specific LSA task is addressed and key sub-task points are noted. Relatively detailed discussions of the analysis process of identifying supportability functions, alternatives and trades constitute the majority of the paper. In the course of the analysis emphasis was placed upon early identification of logistics factors that could influence SDS design to enhance supportability, reduce life-cycle costs (LCC), optimize system readiness, and eliminate or mitigate logistic problems areas. It should be noted three primary factors make this LSA effort unique: first, SDS is accurately described as a "System for Systems" which necessitates a top-down approach in the analysis; second, maintenance and servicing of space-based assets, particularly on this scale, have no precedent and require new approaches to achieve cost effectiveness; and third, these types of satellites, with the necessary modularity for servicing, have not been previously constructed. Finally, the adoption, development, and/or use of computer models to identify high cost driver, conduct sensitivity analyses and tradeoffs is discussed.
Published on 04/12/2018
Document details: 9 pages. 6 downloads.