This field manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today’s operational environment (OE)—an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources.
Uploaded by christofersmith on 04/20/2009
Digital publication details: 300 pages.
Army and Marine Field Manual for Counter Insurgency Strategy
Uploaded by oliveandarrow on 12/05/2009
Digital publication details: 282 pages.
Due to the perceived success of population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) in Iraq, it has been implemented in Afghanistan as well. However, it has still not been decided conclusively whether COIN was successfully implemented by the US led coalition in Iraq. This thesis examines whether COIN achieved its intended objectives in Iraq, from a grounds-up perspective. It presents metrics and hypotheses for measuring COIN success in Iraq, assigns them relative weights, and extracts key parameters from the data using machine learning approaches. The Iraq War Logs, released by WikiLeaks, are used as the data source. The analysis demonstrates that population-centric COIN campaign did not succeed in achieving its intended goals. Even though some measurable improvements were observed in many core metrics on the ground, they were insufficient to collectively make the campaign a success.
Uploaded by svoberoi on 08/25/2011
Digital publication details: 61 pages.
A brochure containing significant and popular counterinsurgency (COIN) publications from the RAND Corporation.
Uploaded by rand_corporation on 04/13/2009
Digital publication details: 6 pages.
This guide employs a COIN model that comprises main functional components:The political function, economic function, security function, and information function
Uploaded by rborum on 01/23/2010
Digital publication details: 67 pages.
Insurgencies do not have military objectives; instead, they have political goals. Consequently, they create asymmetrical conditions at the tactical level which rely upon the population as both the principal actor and prize of the conflict. This doctrine for COIN takes the form of a guide developed for tactical level units and headquarters: it responds first and foremost to an operational need. This guide strives to be simple, concrete and effective. At the same time, the goal is to provide orientation for today and for the future, and, to go beyond the framework of any one theater of operations, regardless of how large the scope might be.
Uploaded by bayarearesistance on 09/04/2012
Digital publication details: 72 pages.
Report from Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (United States, 20 March 2013).
Uploaded by openbriefing on 03/19/2013
Digital publication details: 186 pages.
Poster presenting research findings from an effort to develop a method for characterizing soft data sources and integrating them into a fusion system
Uploaded by mpj6 on 03/10/2011
Digital publication details: 1 pages.
RAND Review, flagship magazine of the RAND Corporation, showcases RAND research on a variety of timely and relevant issues facing the world today.
Uploaded by rand_corporation on 02/12/2009
Digital publication details: 48 pages.
U.S. Counterinsurgency Tactics in the Cold War and the War on Terror (Phil Neff, December 2005)
Uploaded by illiterati on 12/13/2005
Digital publication details: 15 pages.